International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of Internal Investigations by Dervan, Lucian E.
Belmont University
Belmont Digital Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship College of Law
2012
International White Collar Crime and the
Globalization of Internal Investigations
Lucian E. Dervan
Belmont University - College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.belmont.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Belmont Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Belmont Digital Repository. For more information, please contact repository@belmont.edu.
Recommended Citation
39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 361 (2012)
 101 
INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
Lucian E. Dervan
*
 
ABSTRACT 
Much has been written about the methods by which counsel may effi-
ciently, thoroughly, and credibly conduct internal investigations.1  Given 
the globalization of such matters, however, this Article seeks to focus on 
the challenges present when conducting an internal investigation of poten-
tial international white-collar criminal activity.  In Part I, this Article will 
examine the challenges of selecting counsel to perform internal investiga-
tions abroad.  In particular, consideration will be given to global standards 
regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege and work product 
protections.  In Part II, this Article will discuss the influence of data priva-
cy and protection laws in various countries and analyze the challenges of 
attempting to conduct an American-style internal investigation in such ju-
risdictions.  Part III of this Article will examine interactions with employ-
ees during international internal investigations and will consider the chal-
lenges of complying with varying labor laws and due process requirements 
around the world.  Finally, in Part IV, this Article will discuss the hazards 
of multi-jurisdictional investigations by government agencies.  In particu-
lar, consideration will be given to decisions regarding the disclosure of in-
vestigatory findings and the difficulties of engaging in settlement negotia-
tions in an international enforcement environment. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, and former mem-
ber of the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and Government Investigations Team.  
Special thanks to my research assistant, Brian Lee, for his work on this project, along with 
the research assistance of Allison Balch, Katie Oehmke, Angela Rollins, and Neil Schonert.   
 1. See generally Lucian E. Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct in 
the Age of the Whistleblower: Foreseeing and Avoiding Hidden Dangers, 3 BLOOMBERG 
CORP. L.J. 670 (2008) [hereinafter Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct]; 
Paul B. Murphy &  Lucian E. Dervan, Watching Your Step: Avoiding the Pitfalls and Perils 
When Conducting Internal Investigations, 16 ALAS LOSS PREVENTION J. 2 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 14, 2010, Russian authorities raided Hewlett-Packard’s (HP’s) 
Moscow company offices in search of information regarding an alleged 
scheme by employees in Germany to bribe Russian officials.2  HP’s Ger-
man subsidiary allegedly paid kickbacks in Russia to obtain a €35 million 
contract for the delivery and installation of an information technology net-
work to a Russian public prosecutor’s office.3  By September 2010, HP 
publicly disclosed through its securities filings that the criminal investiga-
tions into the scheme had spread well beyond Germany and Russia and 
now included an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).4  Further, HP revealed that 
the investigation by the United States’ government had expanded to include 
 
 2. See Bruce Zagaris, Bribery Investigation of Hewlett-Packard Spread, 26 INT’L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP. 445, 445 (2010) [hereinafter Zagaris, Bribery Investigation] (“Russian 
authorities conducted the searches at the request of German authorities, investigating $7 
million in suspicious payments to Russian officials.”); see also Bruce E. Yannet & David 
M. Fuhr, Russia: H-P Bribery Investigation and Public and Private Anti-Corruption Efforts, 
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA UPDATE 9, at 3 (2010) (citations omitted) (“The investi-
gation reportedly began in 2007 after a German tax auditor became suspicious of payments 
a Germany H-P subsidiary made totaling €22 million to a small computer hardware firm 
near Leipzig from 2004 to 2006.  The H-P subsidiary recorded the payments as having been 
made for services rendered in Moscow.  The investigation also identified three payment in-
termediaries, shell companies in multiple jurisdictions, and a Moscow-based computer sup-
plier with foreign bank accounts as having conspired with H-P to perpetrate the alleged 
bribery scheme.  Using H-P funds, the intermediaries—based in former East Germany—
allegedly paid fake invoices to the shell companies for equipment.  The illicit funds then 
flowed through bank accounts all over the world—including the U.K., the U.S., New Zea-
land, the British Virgin Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Belize, Austria, and Switzerland—before 
making their way to Russia.”).  
 3. See Zagaris, Bribery Investigation, supra note 2, at 445.  
 4. See Joseph Palazzolo, H-P Bribe Probe Widens, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704644404575481961121687910.html. 
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Germany, Russia, Austria, Serbia, and the Netherlands.5  The proliferation 
of an alleged bribe in Germany into subsequent government investigations 
in as many as twelve countries around the globe demonstrates the truly in-
ternational nature of white collar crime in the twenty-first century.6  With 
this internationalization of white collar crime and increase in global en-
forcement initiatives and cooperatives comes an inevitable byproduct: the 
globalization of internal corporate investigations.7 
The historical rise of internal investigations as an important tool in the 
arsenals of corporate defense counsel can be traced to increasingly aggres-
sive enforcement programs by the SEC in the 1960s.8  During this period, 
the SEC staff was tasked with creating innovative enforcement mechanisms 
by which corporations would be required to engage in activities to restore 
the corporation to a “pre-violation, law-abiding condition.”9  One example 
 
 5. See Brandon Bailey, HP Corruption Case Expands to Other European Countries, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010) (“HP also said in its report that U.S. authorities 
have sought information relating to whether HP personnel in Russia, Germany, Austria, 
Serbia and the Netherlands ‘were involved in kickbacks or other improper payments’ to dis-
tributors, government agencies or private parties.”). 
 6. See Michael D. Hausfeld, Global Enforcement of Anticompetitive Conduct, 10 SE-
DONA CONF. J. 9, 9 (2009) (“Globalization of commerce has increased the economic inter-
dependence of countries around the world.  The increasing integration of markets has 
brought with it an increase in the number and frequency of anti-competitive business prac-
tices, affecting economies worldwide.”); Bruce Zagaris, International Enforcement Law 
Trends for 2010 and Beyond: Can the Cops Keep Up with the Criminals?, 34 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter Zagaris, International Enforcement] (“The 
modern economy, globalization, and new technologies facilitate the spread of transnational 
crime, especially economic crime.”). 
 7. See Tommy Helsby, Compliance: Why ‘by the Book’ is Good for the Books, CORP. 
GOV. ASIA, Apr.–June 2011, at 30, available at 
http://www.krollconsulting.com/media/pdfs/Corporate_Gov_Asia_Tommy_Helsby_July_20
11_jpg.pdf (“The past twelve months have brought not only tougher regulation, including 
the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States and the Bribery Act in the United Kingdom, but 
also more active enforcement—notably increased resources devoted to corruption investiga-
tions in the United States at the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as well as a similar business crime focus in Britain at the Serious Fraud Office.  
Meanwhile, storied magistrates elsewhere in Europe—Joly in France, Garzon in Spain, 
DiPietro in Italy—have been succeeded by a new generation of officials keen to make their 
names.  Prosecutors in Germany, often in cooperation with their counterparts in the United 
States and elsewhere, have successfully targeted a series of major domestic businesses.”); 
see also Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 325, 325–26 (1997) (discussing the increase and anticipated increase 
in enforcement regarding international activities).  
 8. See Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 
656 (1984) (“I first began to observe the development of corporate self-investigations as an 
outgrowth of the increased pace of the SEC’s nationwide enforcement program in the early 
1960s.”).  
 9. See id. at 656–57 (“[T]he Enforcement staff [in the 1960s] was encouraged to seek 
sometimes novel, somewhat exotic additional relief in important civil injunctive actions.  
Such ancillary relief, as it came to be called, was designed to make victims whole and to 
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of such ancillary relief was the requirement that a receiver be appointed to 
ensure corporate improprieties were halted.10  Over time, however, corpo-
rations began to propose an alternative to receivership, which was a costly 
and intrusive form of government oversight.11  Instead, corporations began 
proposing that injunctive relief orders contain a requirement that the corpo-
ration undertake an internal investigation on its own using special counsel 
to achieve the same ends.12  By the early 1970s, the ordering of internal in-
vestigations led by the corporation, rather than the SEC, had become the 
norm, with one court commenting that the appointment of special counsel 
to conduct an internal investigation as part of an SEC settlement was “a 
‘desirable and economical practice’ that ‘allows the company to keep its 
own house clean and avoid unnecessary governmental supervision.’”13 
 
restore corporate circumstances to healthier, pre-violation, law-abiding conditions: it was an 
important supplement to the traditional injunctive order, which merely deterred future viola-
tions.  The decade of the 1960s saw SEC civil injunctive enforcement actions request with 
increasing regularity such ancillary relief.  The SEC sought ancillary relief in such forms as 
appointment of receivers or special agents, restitution or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, 
limitations on activities of officers or directors, wholesale restructuring of boards or direc-
tors, accountings, and restrictions on voting blocs of stock and rescission offers.”). 
 10. See id. at 657 (“For example . . . the SEC sought, in addition to injunctive relief, res-
titution of over $1.2 million from the principal officers and directors of the corporate de-
fendant, as well as appointment of a receiver to assure that corporate affairs would be con-
ducted properly, that all self-dealing would be halted, and that the company’s deficient SEC 
filings would be corrected.”). 
 11. See id. (“Astute defense counsel, wiser and more experienced than I, were willing to 
counsel their clients to provide the requested restitution after an appropriate accounting, but 
refused to consider appointment of a receiver. . . .  [C]ounsel countered the SEC’s request 
for a receiver with an offer to have the district court appoint three new independent directors 
to constitute a court-supervised majority on the five-person board . . . and to charge the in-
dependent directors to pursue an internal corporate investigation.”). 
 12. See id. at 658 (“Thus, by the early 1970s, the SEC was gradually learning that an 
efficacious way to straighten out huge corporate messes brought to surface by some of its 
major enforcement actions was to restructure boards of directors and cause independent di-
rectors or their special counsel to accomplish internal corporate self-investigations, rather 
than to tie up scarce government resources to do the whole job in each case.”). 
 13. Id. at 661 (quoting United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 96,519, at 94,024 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1978)); see  Mathews, supra note 8, at 
661–62 (“It gradually became rather routine to settle an SEC enforcement case against a ma-
jor corporation by agreeing to have outside counsel serve as special counsel in conducting 
an internal corporate investigation on behalf of the company’s board of directors or audit 
committee.”); see also David S. Hilzenrath, U.S. Investigations of Firms Rely on Compa-
nies’ Own Legal Work, WASH. POST (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/justice-department-sec-investigations-
often-rely-on-companies-internal-probes/2011/04/26/AFO2HP9G_story.html (“As the U.S. 
government steps up investigations of companies suspected of paying bribes overseas, law 
enforcement officials are leaving much of the detective work to the very corporations under 
suspicion.  The probes are so costly and wide-ranging that the Justice Department and Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission often let the companies investigate themselves.”).  
Hilzenrath’s article further notes that Avon has confirmed spending more than $130 million 
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In 1977, in the wake of the Watergate scandal and revelations that hun-
dreds of American corporations were bribing foreign governmental offi-
cials, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was passed into law.14  
The statute, which remains a centerpiece of international white collar crim-
inal enforcement today, prohibits  
corruptly paying or promising to pay money or anything of value to a for-
eign official, foreign political party, foreign political party official, or 
candidate for foreign political office to influence the foreign official in the 
exercise of his or her official duties to assist the payor in obtaining or re-
taining business.15   
Given the sensitive nature and significant business and reputational risks 
associated with criminal charges stemming from this type of conduct, 
American corporations began to realize the value of conducting internal in-
vestigations before the government became involved in the matter, rather 
than merely utilizing this tool to settle existing enforcement actions.16 As a 
result, corporations and their counsel began to ask why it would not be 
more prudent for a company to investigate itself privately without court su-
pervision, SEC monitoring, or inflexible conditions imposed by a consent 
decree.  By employing a self-investigation procedure, a company could use 
inside or outside counsel, not necessarily wholly independent, and at least 
not subject to prior approval of the SEC or the court.17 
With the realization in the 1970s of the significant advantages of acting 
in advance of government inquiries, the modern internal corporate investi-
gation was born.18 
 
on internal investigations in recent years, and Siemens has spent about $950 million on re-
cent global bribery inquiries. Id.  
 14. See F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer & Michael S. Diamant, The British are Com-
ing!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against 
Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2010).  
 15. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); see Warin et al., 
supra note 14, at 8–9 (“The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions cast a wide net.  They can en-
snare corporations and individuals, including any officer, director, employee, or agent of a 
corporation and any stockholder acting on behalf of a subject entity.”). 
 16. See Mathews, supra note 8, at 666 (“As the sensitive foreign payments cases mush-
roomed in the mid-1970s, the corporate defense bar awoke to the fact that proper corporate 
maneuvering in advance of, or in the midst of, an SEC enforcement investigation might lead 
to a less painful resolution of corporate payments.”).   
 17. Id.  
 18. See Sarah H. Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professional-
ism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 869–71 (2003) (discussing 
the government’s increased focus on corporate crime beginning in the 1960s and the result-
ing increase in internal investigations by corporations seeking to “identify and address is-
sues before they became the focus of government inquiries.”); Kevin H. Michels, Internal 
Corporate Investigations and the Truth, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 83, 84 (2010) (“In 2008, 
nearly half of all United States public companies commissioned outside counsel to conduct 
at least one internal investigation.”); Richard H. Porter, Voluntary Disclosures to Federal 
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Much has been written about the methods by which counsel may effi-
ciently, thoroughly, and credibly conduct internal investigations.19  Given 
the globalization of such matters, however, this Article seeks to focus on 
the challenges present when conducting an internal investigation of poten-
tial international white collar criminal activity.  In Part I, this Article will 
examine the challenges of selecting counsel to perform internal investiga-
tions abroad.  In particular, consideration will be given to global standards 
regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege and work product 
protections.  In Part II, this Article will discuss the influence of data priva-
cy and protection laws in various countries and analyze the challenges of 
attempting to conduct an American-style internal investigation in such ju-
risdictions.  Part III of this Article will examine interactions with employ-
ees during international internal investigations and consider the challenges 
of complying with varying labor laws and due process requirements around 
the world.  Finally, in Section IV, this Article will discuss the hazards of 
multi-jurisdictional investigations by government agencies.  In particular, 
consideration will be given to decisions regarding the disclosure of investi-
gatory findings and the difficulties of engaging in settlement negotiations 
in an international enforcement environment. 
I.  SELECTING THE INVESTIGATORS IN INTERNATIONAL MATTERS 
One of the most important initial considerations when launching an in-
ternal investigation is determining who will conduct the inquiry.20  Several 
options exist, including utilizing corporate human resources, internal com-
pliance officers, in-house counsel, or outside counsel.21  In the context of 
potential international white collar criminal activity, however, it is clear 
that independent counsel should be retained as soon as possible to achieve 
 
Agencies—Their Impact on the Ability of Corporations to Protect from Discovery Materials 
Developed During the Course of Internal Investigations, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1007, 1007 
(1990) (“In many American corporations, internal investigations are becoming common-
place.”).    
 19. See generally Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1; 
Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1. 
 20. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 676 
(“The first question that must be answered after an employee reports potential misconduct is 
who will perform the internal investigation.”).  While there are a myriad of challenges that 
arise during international internal investigations, this Article will only focus on a select few 
issues that arise commonly during these inquiries.  Counsel should be aware, however, that 
many other unique challenges can arise from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the international 
arena.  As such, counsel must be proactive in ensuring an awareness of such issues.  One 
mechanism by which to better understand the unique legal requirements in each jurisdiction 
is to ensure local counsel is available for consultation.  
 21. Id. (“Where the issue does not implicate any potential wrongdoing on the part of the 
corporation or any of its employees and the issues are not prohibitively complex, the inves-
tigation may be handled internally.”).   
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two important goals.22  First, retention of outside counsel makes investiga-
tive findings more credible, because the government often looks with sus-
picion upon the statements and conclusions of insiders who may either be 
involved in the underlying misconduct or, at a minimum, who have a sig-
nificant financial stake in the investigation’s outcome.23  Second, utiliza-
tion of attorneys to conduct the investigation, rather than corporate em-
ployees or officers, shields investigative memoranda, reports, and 
conclusions from involuntary disclosure to third parties, including the gov-
ernment, because of the application of the attorney-client privilege and 
work product protections.24  While it appears at first glance that the issue of 
 
 22. Id. (“However, once it becomes clear that there may be potential corporate liability 
or the issues become sufficiently complex, involvement by outside counsel is likely war-
ranted.”). 
 23. See Robert S. Bennett, Alan Kriegel, Carl S. Rauth & Charles F. Walker, Internal 
Investigations and the Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 BUS. LAW. 
55, 62 (2006) (“Although the perception may be unfair, in-house counsel are likely to be 
viewed by the government as lacking independence due to their status as part of the corpo-
rate management structure.  This can be a particular problem where the government per-
ceives a conflict between the interests of a company’s management and the interests of its 
employees.”); J. Justin Johnston, Corporate Investigations After the Mortgage Meltdown, 65 
J. MO. B. 70, 73 (2009) (“[I]n fraud cases particularly, an internal investigation may require 
scrutiny of high-level corporate officers and others with power to affect in-house counsel’s 
future with the company.  Under no circumstances should in-house counsel be asked to in-
vestigate such persons due to the inherent lack of credibility regarding his or her conclu-
sions.”). 
 24. See Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 63 (discussing the importance of establishing 
attorney-client privilege during an internal investigation); Johnston, supra note 23, at 73 
(“Clearly, an investigation can be handled by non-attorney corporate employees, such as 
company security, or corporate officers.  The drawback to this method is that attorney-client 
privilege and work product protections do not attach to the result of the investigation.”); 
Porter, supra note 18, at 1009–10 (“Furthermore, there is a compelling practical reason why 
the investigation should not be conducted by management personnel: It is highly unlikely 
that documents generated during an investigation conducted by managerial personnel can be 
shielded from discovery by third parties.”). See generally Thomas R. Mulroy & Eric J. 
Munoz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 49 (2002) (dis-
cussing the importance of attorney-client privilege and work product protection in the inter-
nal investigation context).   
Interestingly, the application of attorney-client privilege and work product protection to in-
ternal investigations in the United States was not always assured.  In the mid-1970s, a com-
pany called Diversified Industries undertook an internal corporate investigation regarding 
allegations of commercial bribery. See Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 
596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977); Mathews, supra note 8, at 669. The report produced by counsel 
conducting the internal investigation was provided to the SEC and proved extremely helpful 
in negotiating a favorable resolution of the matter. Id. Later, however, private litigators 
sought copies of the internal investigation report for use in their civil suits. Id. The issue 
went to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, where a panel ruled that 
the material was not protected:  
[With regard to the investigatory report], [w]e have concluded . . . that the report 
is not entitled to protection on the basis of either attorney-client privilege or work 
product immunity. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the persons inter-
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who will conduct the investigation is a simple one in the context of interna-
tional white collar crime, the reality of international multi-jurisdictional in-
quiries makes this a complex and precarious area in which several potential 
pitfalls exist.25 
 On February 10, 2003, the European Union’s (EU) Commission, 
charged with developing antitrust rules for the EU and investigating alleged 
violations of EU competition provisions, ordered Akzo Nobel Chemicals 
Ltd. (Akzo) and Akcros Chemicals Ltd. (Akcros) to submit to an inquiry 
regarding potential anti-competitive practices.26  On February 12 and 13, 
2003, the Commission carried out a dawn raid on the companies’ Manches-
ter, Britain, offices in search of documents relevant to the governmental in-
vestigation.27  During the search, Commission officials discovered two 
emails that appeared to contain relevant information.28  The emails were an 
exchange regarding antitrust issues between a general manager and Akzo’s 
in-house counsel, who was in charge of coordinating competition law and 
 
viewed by the Firm’s representatives should be considered as “clients” because 
we are persuaded that Law Firm was not hired by Diversified to provide legal ser-
vices or advice.  It was employed solely for the purpose of making an investiga-
tion of facts and to make business recommendations with respect to the future 
conduct of Diversified in such areas as the results of the investigation might sug-
gest.  
Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 603.  Fortunately for the future of such internal investiga-
tions, the Eighth Circuit en banc reversed the decision of the appellate panel:   
To be sure, there are possibilities of abuse, but the application of the attorney-
client privilege to this matter and others like it will encourage corporations to seek 
out and correct wrongdoing in their own house and to do so with attorneys who 
are obligated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to conduct the inquiry in 
an independent and ethical manner. . . .  We conclude that these employee inter-
views are confidential communications of the corporate client and entitled to the 
attorney-client privilege.  
Id. at 610–11; see also United States v. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981) (estab-
lishing the modern standard by which privilege applies to internal corporate investigations). 
 25. See Walfrido J. Martinez, Recent Trends in and Practical Guidance for Preventing 
and Defending International White Collar Crime, in INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR EN-
FORCEMENT: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, COM-
PLYING WITH FCPA INVESTIGATIONS, AND ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE CORPORATE COMPLI-
ANCE PROGRAMS, 2011 EDITION 81, 93 (Michaela Falls ed., 2010) [hereinafter INT’L WHITE 
COLLAR ENFORCEMENT 2011 ED.], available at 2010 WL 5312203, at *6 (“Attorneys repre-
senting clients in the international context must immediately familiarize themselves with the 
rules concerning privilege in order to minimize the risk of having ‘privileged’ information 
disclosed to third parties.”).  
 26. See Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. European Comm’n, 5 C.M.L.R. 
19, 1191 (2010).  
 27. See id.; Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., European Rejection of Attorney-Client Privi-
lege for Inside Lawyers, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 
2, 2010), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/10/02/european-rejection-of-attorney-
client-privilege-for-inside-lawyers. 
 28. See Heineman, Jr., supra note 27. 
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who was a licensed practitioner in the Netherlands.29  Though company of-
ficials protested, the Commission’s representatives took the emails after 
concluding that the documents were not protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.30 
The basis for the Commission representatives’ decision to seize the doc-
uments was a 1982 European Court of Justice decision entitled AM&S v. 
Commission.31  In AM&S, the Commission sought documents regarding 
potential price-fixing from AM&S’s Bristol, England, offices that the com-
pany claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege.32  In consid-
ering the application of privilege to the documents, the court held that an 
EU rule of privilege, rather than a country specific rule, applied in all 
Commission investigations of anti-competitive practices.33  To fall within 
the protection of the EU rule of privilege, two elements were required to be 
satisfied.34  “First, the communication must have been given for purposes 
of the client’s defense.  Second, the communication must have been with 
an independent lawyer, which would not include in-house counsel.”35  As 
the emails seized in the Akzo Nobel case involved communications between 
an in-house attorney and a company manager, the Commission believed 
 
 29. See Heineman, Jr., supra note 27 (“At issue were two emails about antitrust issues—
obtained in a dawn raid aimed at enforcing EU competition laws—exchanged between a 
general manager and an in-house lawyer who was a member of the Netherlands bar.”); see 
also Laurel S. Terry, Introductory Note to the Court of Justice of the European Union: The 
Akzo Nobel EU Attorney-Client Privilege Case, 50 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 2 (2011) 
(noting that under the laws of the Netherlands, communications by this in-house counsel 
with his client, the corporation, were protected by the attorney-client privilege).  
 30. See Akzo Nobel Chems., 5 C.M.L.R. at 1191 (“After examining the last three docu-
ments and obtaining the applicants’ observations, the head of the investigating team took the 
view that they were definitely not privileged.”).  
 31. See Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1982 
E.C.R. 1575; see also Maurits Dolmans, Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel: A 
European Proposal, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 125, 125 (1998) (discussing the state of privilege 
in Europe); Terry, supra note 29, at 1. 
 32. See Dan R. Mastromarco, Disparity in the Application of Legal Principles as a 
Form of Trade Restraint: Attorney-Client Privilege in the European Community, 13 HAS-
TINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 479, 482 (1990); see also Theofanis Christoforou, Protection 
of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law: The Imperfections of a Case, 9 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1, 2 (1985).  
 33. See Terry, supra note 29, at 1.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1–2; see also Stephen A. Calhoun, Globalization’s Erosion of the Attorney-
Client Privilege and What U.S. Courts Can Do to Prevent It, 87 TEX. L. REV. 235, 240 
(2008) (“First, the communications must be ‘made for the purposes and in the interests of 
the client’s right of defence.’ Second, the communications must ‘emanate from independent 
lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employ-
ment.’”).  
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they were not protected from disclosure, even though privilege rules in the 
Netherlands would have protected the exchange.36 
The dispute over the documents taken from the Manchester offices con-
tinued with the companies sending a letter of complaint to the Commission 
in mid-February 2003.37  On May 8, 2003, however, the Commission re-
jected the application of privilege and the request for the return of the 
emails.38  Later that year, the companies filed an action with the EU’s Gen-
eral Court, and the matter eventually made its way back to the European 
Court of Justice almost twenty years after the AM&S case.39 
In its Akzo Nobel decision rejecting the companies’ claims of privilege, 
the European Court of Justice reaffirmed its earlier, narrow interpretation 
of the applicability of privilege in the corporate context.40  In particular, the 
court stated, “It follows, both from the in-house lawyer’s economic de-
pendence and the close ties with his employer, that he does not enjoy a lev-
el of professional independence comparable to that of an external lawyer,” 
resulting in a failure to satisfy the second prong of the AM&S test.41  Im-
portantly, however, the court noted that the EU privilege standard estab-
lished in AM&S and reiterated in Akzo Nobel applies only to EU investiga-
tions, such as those conducted by the Commission regarding anti-
competitive practices.42  As such, in other legal situations the various laws 
 
 36. Terry, supra note 29, at 2 n.10 (“The contract between Akzo and its in-house coun-
sel specifically acknowledged the in-house counsel’s freedom and independence.  Under 
Dutch law, this agreement and the lawyer’s status as a member of the bar meant that Dutch 
[privilege laws] applied.”).  
 37. See Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. European Comm’n, 5 C.M.L.R. 
19, 1191 (2010). 
 38. See id. at 1192. 
 39. See id.  
 40. See id. at 1201; see also John Gergacz, Privileged Communications with In-House 
Counsel Under United States and European Community Law: A Proposed Re-Evaluation of 
the Akzo Nobel Decision, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323, 323 (2009) (“In Akzo Nobel, the 
court held that lawyers employed as in-house counsel were not independent of their corpo-
rate employers and, thus, could not engage in privileged communications with their client, 
the corporation.”); Mauro Squitieri, The Use of Information in EU Competition Proceedings 
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 42 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 449, 461–64 (2011) (discuss-
ing the Akzo decision).  
 41. Akzo Nobel Chems., 5 C.M.L.R. at 1198. (“Therefore, the General Court correctly 
applied the second condition from legal professional privilege laid down in the judgment in 
Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities.”).  
 42. See Terry, supra note 29, at 3 (“As [commentators] have correctly observed, Akzo 
Nobel does not invalidate or change the legal professional privilege that applies to Member 
State proceedings . . . .  Moreover, AM&S and Akzo Nobel were limited to the Commission’s 
competition investigations, not competition proceedings by Member States.”).  
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of each individual country of the EU apply, some of which take similar 
views of in-house counsel.43 
As the Akzo Nobel decision makes strikingly clear, one must be familiar 
with privilege laws in the jurisdictions, both regional and national, involved 
in an international internal investigation as the rules vary dramatically by 
country and subject matter.44  While the different variations of privilege 
can have a myriad of impacts on an internal inquiry, two will be mentioned 
here specifically.  First, the role of in-house counsel, including a corpora-
tion’s general counsel, must be closely examined.  While it is common for 
in-house counsel in the United States to perform a preliminary inquiry to 
determine whether outside counsel is required for a more extensive investi-
gation, in some jurisdictions the materials and information collected during 
this initial appraisal of the situation might not be protected from compulso-
ry disclosure.45  Further, to the extent in-house counsel seeks to assist out-
side counsel during the performance of the internal investigation, consider-
ation must be given to whether such activity would be covered by 
privilege.46  While an argument exists that any such assistance by in-house 
counsel would be at the direction of a recognized outside “attorney,” this 
argument may be defeated in jurisdictions that interpret privilege in a nar-
row fashion.47  Second, counsel must be aware of the possibility that attor-
 
 43. See id. at 1 (“In addition to its rules about bar eligibility, each EU Member State has 
its own set of rules or case-law governing the confidentiality or privileged nature of com-
munications between clients and their lawyers.  These national laws vary in some significant 
respects.  For example, in some EU Member States, the privilege belongs to the client, 
whereas in other Member States, the privilege belongs to the lawyer.  In some EU Member 
States, confidentiality can be waived, whereas in other Member States, this is not possi-
ble.”); see also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., International HR Best Practice Tips: Conducting 
Internal Employee Investigation Outside the U.S., 19 INT’L HUM. RESOURCES J. 1, 4 (2010) 
(“Jurisdictions like Hungary do not recognize a viable in-house lawyer privilege.  A broad 
overview published in Inside Counsel lists the ‘EU member states that recognize privilege 
for the in-house bar’ as ‘Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, UK.’”). 
 44. See Terry, supra note 29, at 1. 
 45. See supra notes 31–43 and accompanying text; see also Gergacz, supra note 40, at 
328 (“Under the law of the United States, in-house counsel are not disqualified from having 
privileged communications with their client . . . .  Thus, a lawyer’s employment status as in-
house or outside counsel has never affected the applicability of the attorney-client privilege 
in the United States.”).  
 46. See Gergacz, supra note 40, at 328. 
 47. See Fed. R. Evid. 501 (2011).  
The value of the privilege would be substantially diminished if it covered only 
statements between the attorney and the client. Often the attorney must retain 
agents, such as private investigators and psychiatric and forensic experts. If com-
munications to these agents resulted in a loss of privilege, then the agents could 
not be effectively used, and the effectiveness of the representation (which the 
privilege serves to strengthen) would suffer. Accordingly, communications from 
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neys from one region of the globe might not enjoy any privilege protections 
in certain jurisdictions, even if they are independent outside counsel.  As 
has been noted by some commentators, the European Court of Justice’s de-
cision on the issue of privilege in Akzo Nobel contains language indicating 
attorneys unlicensed within the EU itself may not enjoy privilege when 
working for clients within its borders.48  While grappling with the difficul-
ties presented by these divergent privilege rules is challenging, conducting 
an international internal investigation without consideration of their impact 
on the course and conduct of the inquiry could be fatal. 
II.  COLLECTING, REVIEWING AND TRANSFERRING INVESTIGATORY 
DOCUMENTS FROM ABROAD 
The starting place for any internal investigation is the collection of rele-
vant documentary evidence for review and analysis.49  Such an undertaking 
allows counsel to begin the process of compartmentalizing information, 
piecing together facts, identifying issues for further analysis, and preparing 
for employee interviews.50  In the international context, however, collec-
tion, review, and transfer of documentation can present unique challenges 
to counsel because of the growing prevalence of data protection laws 
 
the client to and through agents hired by the attorney in furtherance of the repre-
sentation can qualify for the attorney-client privilege.  
Id., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Daniel J. Capra & Michael M. Martin cmt. 
 48. See Terry, supra note 29, at 3 (footnote omitted) (“One of the unanswered questions 
after Akzo Nobel is the extent to which the EU competition LPP [privilege rules] excludes 
non-EU lawyers.  On the one hand, both the AM&S decision and the Akzo Nobel Advocate 
General’s opinion include language that arguably limits LPP to lawyers located with the EU 
and the European Economic Area . . . .  On the other hand, the Akzo Nobel decision itself 
refers to the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ indicators of ‘independence’ but does not use lan-
guage that would automatically exclude from LPP protection communications with inde-
pendent, non-employed lawyers from non-EU/EEA nations.”). 
 49. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 676 
(“The first step in any internal investigation is the gathering of the relevant information 
through collection and review of documents.”); Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, 
supra note 1, at 6–7 (discussing the importance of document collection); see also Johnston, 
supra note 23, at 73 (“Before an investigator begins the all-important process of interview-
ing corporate employees and other available witnesses, it is advisable that the investigator 
identify and gather all possible sources of documentary evidence relating to the conduct in 
question.”).  
 50. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 676 
(discussing the need for documentation to draw accurate and credible conclusions during an 
internal investigation); Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1, at 6 (“Another 
important aspect of a credible investigation is ensuring that the documents necessary to 
make accurate findings are present and available for review.  Without the relevant materials, 
it may be difficult or even impossible to make well-supported conclusions about the conduct 
under investigation.”); see also Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 68 (“Generally, when con-
ducting an internal investigation, it is preferable to review the relevant documents prior to 
commencing interviews.”). 
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around the globe.51  First, some data protection laws prevent companies 
from collecting and reviewing information, including company emails, that 
are deemed “personal” without consent from the affected employee.52  Fur-
ther, in securing such consent, the corporation may be required to provide 
the employee access to the material and an opportunity to correct any inac-
curacies.53 
As an example, the EU has adopted data protection laws that define 
“personal data” broadly and require one of several criteria be satisfied be-
fore collection and processing of such information.54 
 
 51. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 2 (describing the challenges associated with cross-
border data transfers and accessing data); see also David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global 
Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and 
Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 3 (1999) 
(“In the early 1970s, countries began adopting broad laws intended to protect individual pri-
vacy.  Throughout the world, there is a general movement towards adopting comprehensive 
privacy laws that set a framework for protection.”).   
 52. See George J. Terwilliger III, Transnational Practice in Preventing and Addressing 
Corruption Cases, in INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT 2011 ED., supra note 25, at 95, 
available at 2010 WL 5312204, at *2 (“Procedural differences among nations also affect the 
ability of a company to address suggestions of internal wrongdoing.  A company conducting 
an internal investigation in the U.S.— a country that does not have the kind of data privacy 
laws that protect an individual’s e-mail traffic and other similar so-called personal data—is 
less confined, as to the scope and process of records review, than it would be in an E.U. 
country, which does have such data privacy laws.”); Miriam Wugmeister, Karin Retzer & 
Cynthia Rich, Global Solution for Cross-Border Transfers: Making the Case for Corporate 
Privacy Rules, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 449, 451 (2007) (“More than sixty countries around the 
world have laws that regulate the collection, use and disclosure of personal information.  
Typically these laws cover any personal information pertaining to individual customers, 
business contacts, consumers, employees and in some cases legal entities.”). See generally 
James Sullivan, IADC International Law Committee Survey of Electronic Discovery and 
Data Privacy Law, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 396 (2010) (reviewing data privacy laws around the 
world). 
 53. See Terwilliger, supra note 52, at *2 (“For example, a U.S. investigator . . . may be 
obliged to provide data subjects with access to the data targeted by the investigation and al-
low the data subjects to make corrections to any inaccurate data.”); see also Dowling, supra 
note 43, at 2 (“Counterintuitively, data laws can actually require turning investigation notes 
and files over to targets or witnesses.  In EU jurisdictions, employee ‘data subjects’ enjoy 
broad rights to access, and to request deletion or ‘rectification’ of, employer-maintained 
documents identifying them.”); Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 451 (“[These laws] also 
require that individuals whose personal information is maintained by an organization be 
given notice of, and in certain circumstances the right to consent (or to withhold consent) to, 
the collection, use and transfer of their personal information, as well as the right to access 
and correct the information held about them.”). 
It should be noted that this right may even extend to internal investigatory notes.  As one 
publication regarding such investigations noted, “Data law in some jurisdictions can require 
notifying targets and implicated witnesses that investigation notes identify them, and can 
require offering them limited access to a pending-investigation file.” Dowling, supra note 
43, at 5. 
 54. See Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 456; see also Beryl A. Howell & Laura S. 
Wertheimer, Data Detours in Internal Investigations in EU Countries: Part I, 16 METRO. 
CORP. COUNS. 30 (2008) [hereinafter Howell & Wertheimer, Part I] (third alteration in orig-
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According to the EU Directive, personal information can only be pro-
cessed when one of the following exceptions is met: consent from the in-
dividual; contractual necessity (that is, data may be used if necessary for 
the performance of the contract with the individual); compliance with (lo-
cal) legal obligations; or the legitimate interests of the entity collecting the 
personal information outweigh the privacy interests of the individuals.55 
While one might argue that the covert collection and review of employ-
ees’ personal data as part of an internal investigation regarding potential 
criminal wrongdoing is necessary and permissible under the final above 
criteria, it must be noted that “many of the data privacy laws in the E.U. are 
structured so that the degree of protection that is afforded to an individual’s 
data increases as the investigation trends more toward criminal rather than 
the administrative.”56 
Second, some data protection laws prevent or hinder the transfer of cer-
tain data outside the country of origin, including transfers back to corporate 
headquarters or affiliates located in other countries.57  For example, in the 
EU, the transfer of “personal” information to countries outside the Europe-
an Economic Area is prohibited unless an “adequate” level of protection is 
provided by the country to which the information is being transferred.58  A 
 
inal) (footnote omitted) (“‘[P]ersonal data’ . . . is defined as data that ‘relate[s] to an identi-
fied person or identifiable natural person’ (i.e., the data subject), who ‘can be identified, di-
rectly or indirectly,’ by reference to an identification number or ‘to his physical, physiologi-
cal, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.’”). 
 55. Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 456. 
 56. Terwilliger, supra note 52, at *2 (emphasis added). 
 57. See Christopher J. Clark, The Complexities to International White Collar Enforce-
ment, in INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDER-
STANDING CROSS-BORDER REGULATIONS, DEVELOPING CLIENT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, AND 
RESPONDING TO GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 7, 12 (Michaela Falls ed., 2010) [hereinafter 
INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT], available at 2010 WL 271738, at *4 (“[E]specially in 
Europe the laws relating to the transfer of data and information are extraordinarily strict.  In 
the EU, it is against the law to transfer electronic data out of the EU if it relates to a person.  
That is defined extraordinarily broadly to mean basically any e-mail someone had on their 
work computer.  So if your client gets a subpoena from the U.S. SEC seeking all the e-mails 
relating to someone, and this person worked in France, you will probably have to tell the 
SEC you cannot do that, it is against the law.”); Dowling, supra note 43, at 2 (“In cross-
border investigations, information identifying employees almost inevitably gets transmitted 
back to headquarters.  Before undertaking a specific investigation, build channels allowing 
the legal ‘export’ of investigation data.  This is a keen issue in jurisdictions like Belgium 
and the Netherlands where laws impede cross-border transmissions of workplace accusa-
tions specifically.”); see also Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 449 (“Nevertheless, such 
[data] transfers are becoming more difficult and costly from a business perspective as more 
countries adopt privacy laws that, among other things, regulate and limit cross-border trans-
fers of personal information, including transfers to headquarters, affiliates, branch offices or 
subsidiaries.”). 
 58. See Wugmeister et al., supra note 52, at 458 (“The transfer of personal information 
to countries outside the EEA is prohibited unless the receiving countries provide an “ade-
quate” level of protection, as determined by the European Commission or national DPAs, or 
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failure to satisfy the stringent EU data protection requirements may result 
in substantial liability for the breaching entity, including criminal liability 
for investigating counsel.59 
One company that likely navigated the challenges presented by the 
growing cadre of data protection laws is Avon Products Inc., which since 
2008 has been conducting an international internal investigation regarding 
allegations of bribery by its officials in numerous countries, including Chi-
na.60  China has strong data protection laws, including the Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets (Chinese State Secrets 
Law), which was first passed in 1989 and revised in 2010.61  The Chinese 
State Secrets Law broadly defines state secrets to include “matters that re-
late to state security and national interests,” a statement that leaves much 
ambiguity and uncertainty regarding what types of data may be collected 
 
the transfer satisfies one of the exceptions contained in law . . . .  To date, the European 
Commission has deemed adequate the laws of Argentina, Canada, Guernsey, the Isle of 
Man, and Switzerland, as well as the U.S. Safe Harbor Framework.”). 
 59. Id.; see Howell & Wertheimer, Part I, supra note 54, at 30 (“The specific laws of 
the country in which data is sought for an internal inquiry must be examined, both because 
the substance of the limitations as well as the penalties for violating the limitations, differ.  
For example, violations of the French data protection law carry both civil and criminal pen-
alties, while the UK data protection law does not, as yet, provide criminal penalties.”); Ter-
williger, supra note 52, at *2 (“A U.S. investigator can be held criminally liable in the E.U. 
country for failing to comply with these data processing and export requirements.”).  
 60. See Avon Products, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Oct. 28, 2010), at 10, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/8868/000119312510238768/d10q.htm 
(“As previously reported, we have engaged outside counsel to conduct an internal investiga-
tion and compliance reviews focused on compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”) and related U.S. and foreign laws in China and additional countries.  The internal 
investigation, which is being conducted under the oversight of our Audit Committee, began 
in June 2008.  As we reported in October 2008, we voluntarily contacted the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Department of Justice to advise 
both agencies of our internal investigation.  We are continuing to cooperate with both agen-
cies and inquiries by them, including but not limited to, signing tolling agreements, translat-
ing and producing documents and assisting with interviews.”); see also Chen Weihua, Mul-
tinationals Under Scrutiny for Corruption, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-09/08/content_11273809.htm (“In the past years, 
there have been many high profile bribery cases involving multinationals operating in Chi-
na.  Multinational companies such as Rio Tinto, Siemens, Daimler, Lucent, Avery Den-
nison, IBM, Avon, Diagnostic Products and UTStarcom have all been penalized.”).    
 61. See Sigrid U. Jernudd, Comment, China, State Secrets, and the Case of Xue Feng: 
The Implication for International Trade, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 309, 317 (2011) (“The Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets was first passed in 1989, replac-
ing provisional regulations that were developed in 1951.  The National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee then passed a revised version of the Law on the Protection of State Se-
crets on April 29, 2010.”); see also Mitchell S. Ettinger & Patrick H. Haggerty, Increased 
International Coordination and Cooperation to Fight Corruption and the Impact on Multi-
national Companies, 25TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME, at J-8 
(Mar. 2–5, 2011) (“When exporting data and information, consideration needs to be given to 
state secret laws.  For example, China’s long anticipated amended Law on Guarding State 
Secrets (the Law) came into force on October 1, 2010.”).  
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and transferred out of the country during an investigation.62  As one set of 
practitioners has noted, “[T]he [international internal] investigative team 
must ensure that the data and information being exported from China does 
not constitute state secrets.  This can be difficult given that the categories 
of state secrets remain vague and open to subjective interpretation.”63  Fur-
ther, the penalties for failing to abide by the Chinese State Secrets Law are 
severe, including capital punishments for intentional misappropriations and 
lesser punishments for other disclosures, including the strict liability of-
fense of “stealing” state secrets.64 
An incident perpetuating investigating counsels’ above described uncer-
tainty and anxiety regarding the applicability of the Chinese State Secrets 
Law is the case of Xue Feng.65  Xue Feng, a naturalized American citizen, 
was a geologist working in China for an American company.66  Under in-
structions from his employer, Xue Feng purchased an unprotected database 
regarding oil and gas information and transferred the data out of China to 
his employer in the United States.67  Following the transfer, Chinese au-
thorities determined that the data constituted state secrets under the narrow 
pre-2010 definition and, in 1997, Xue Feng was taken into custody.68  This 
 
 62. Law on the Protection of State Secrets, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, Art. 2, 
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=140200 (last 
visited September 16, 2011); see also Jernudd, supra note 61, at 319 (noting the ongoing 
debate regarding the breadth and transparency of the existing Chinese State Secrets Law).  
 63. Ettinger & Haggerty, supra note 61, at J-8.  
 64. See Jernudd, supra note 61, at 319–20 (“The penalties for violating the State Secrets 
Law are found in the Chinese Criminal Law, which also defines the particular offenses.  The 
most serious offense is that of ‘stealing, spying to obtain, buying, or unlawfully supplying’ 
state secrets to ‘an organ, organization, or individual outside the territories of China,’ which, 
if done with subjective intent to deal with a state secret, will be punished with anything be-
tween five years imprisonment and the death penalty, depending on the seriousness of the 
circumstances of the crime.  Unlawfully acquiring state secrets, either through ‘stealing,’ 
‘spying,’ or ‘buying,’ which does not have a mens rea specified, carries penalties of up to 
three years, or in more serious cases, of three to seven years.  Similar punishments follow 
for the crime of divulging state secrets, which can be done with ‘subjective intent’ or merely 
fault.”). 
 65. See Jernudd, supra note 61, at 322–23. 
 66. See id.; Ariana E. Cha, In China, the Business of ‘State Secrets’, WASH. POST (Mar. 
4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/03/AR2010030303852.html (“When Xue bought the surveys 
and maps for use in his company’s research reports, the information was openly availa-
ble.”); Andrew Jacobs, China Upholds Conviction of American Geologist, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/asia/19beijing.html.  
 67. See Jacobs, supra note 66 (“His lawyer says the information was classified as secret 
only after he bought it.”); Jernudd, supra note 61, at 322 (“[H]e purchased a database of oil 
and gas information that was deemed to be unprotected; however, after its purchase and 
conveyance to the US, China determined that the material was a state secret.”).  
 68. See Jernudd, supra note 61, at 322.  The pre-2010 Chinese State Secrets Law cov-
ered “matters that have a vital bearing on state security and national interests.” Id. at 318.  
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despite the fact that much of the information he transferred to the United 
States on behalf of his employer remains publically available inside Chi-
na.69  Xue Feng was eventually tried and convicted of violating the Chinese 
State Secrets Law and sentenced to eight years in prison for industrial espi-
onage, a sentence that has subsequently been affirmed on appeal.70 
The Xue Feng case and above described Chinese and European data pro-
tection laws convey the significance of carefully contemplating potential 
restrictions on and ramifications flowing from the collection, review, and 
transfer of data and information during international internal investiga-
tions.71  As it becomes increasingly common for countries around the globe 
to create restrictive and varying laws protecting data, internal investigators 
must recognize that utilization of a standard Americanized investigatory 
strategy can result in significant collateral consequences and liabilities for 
both client and counsel.72  As such, internal investigators must be cognizant 
of the difficulties data collection and review present in the international set-
ting and be proactive in determining the most appropriate procedures in 
each individual jurisdictional setting.73 
 
The 2010 amendment removed the terms “vital bearing” and, therefore, made the provision 
arguably broader than that used against Xue Feng. Id.    
 69. Id. at 322 (“Much of the information in the databases is publically available and 
necessary for basic due diligence work for businesses involved with the Central SOEs.”); 
see also Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in China: Company Disclosure and Information 
in China’s Stock Markets, 88 GEO. L.J. 1919, 1950–51 (2000) (“Under the law on Guarding 
State Secrets, state secrets are broadly defined to include nonpublic financial and economic 
information.  In 1994, a reporter for the Ming Pao newspaper in Hong Kong was sentenced 
under this law to ten to twelve years in prison for allegedly disclosing internal interest rate 
and gold policies of the PBOC.  The potential liability for reporting undisclosed material 
may remove the incentive to investigate companies; therefore, company disclosures will re-
main unquestioned.”). 
 70. See Jacobs, supra note 66 (“In a case that has prompted a number of appeals from 
the White House, a Chinese court on Friday upheld the conviction of an American oil geol-
ogist sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of industrial espionage.”).   
 71. See Lorenza F. Hofer, New Conditions for Data Processing by Companies: First 
Experiences with the Revised Swiss Data Protection Law, 5 IBA CONVERGENCE 113 (2009) 
(discussing Swiss data protection laws). See generally Thomas Rihm, New International 
Data Transfer Rules for Switzerland: Business Friendly by Respecting Employees’ Privacy 
Rights, 18 EMP. & INDUS. REL. L. 16 (2008) (discussing Swiss data protection laws).  
 72. See Jorg Rehder & Erika C. Collins, The Legal Transfer of Employment-Related Da-
ta to Outside the EU: Is It Still Even Possible?, 39 INT’L LAW. 129, 129 (2005) (“Current 
European Union (EU) data privacy laws place multinational companies in an unenviable 
position. On one hand, the laws are broadly worded yet strict, and on the other, a multitude 
of questions regarding application and enforcement remain unanswered.”). 
 73. See Beryl A. Howell & Laura S. Wertheimer, Data Detours in Internal Investiga-
tions in EU Countries: Part II, 16 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 38, 39 (2008) [hereinafter Howell 
& Wertheimer, Part II] (“While far from an impossible task, an understanding of the re-
quirements contained in the EU Directive, as well as possible exceptions to these require-
ments, is necessary so that U.S. lawyers conducting an internal inquiry that involves data in 
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III.  DEALING WITH EMPLOYEES IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
There are two particularly defining encounters with employees during an 
internal investigation.  The first is when investigating counsel interviews 
employees as part of the inquiry.74  When conducting such interviews, 
counsel must be cognizant of her ethical and legal duty to clarify the rela-
tionship between herself and the interviewee through the delivery of an 
Upjohn warning.75 
The warning typically includes the following elements: the attorney repre-
sents the corporation and not the individual employee; the interview is 
covered by the attorney-client privilege, which belongs to and is con-
trolled by the corporation, not the individual employee; the corporation 
may decide, in its sole discretion, whether to waive the privilege and dis-
close information from the interview to third parties, including the gov-
ernment.76 
Often, during internal investigations in the United States, little else need 
be done beyond giving the targeted employee this preliminary instruction 
and proceeding with the questioning.77  In foreign jurisdictions, however, 
investigating counsel must be alert to the possibility that local laws may re-
strict one’s ability to conduct employee interviews or, at a minimum, may 
curtail the manner in which any such interview may occur.78  As one com-
mentator notes, several European nations restrict in total the ability of 
 
the EU can collect, process and review the data, without exposing themselves or their clients 
to possible liability for violations of the EU Directive.”). 
 74. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 676 
(“The second step is to gather information through employee interviews.”).   
 75. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 74–75 (“Before beginning the process of witness in-
terviews, however, counsel must consider a key ethical concern: counsel conducting an in-
ternal investigation represents the company, and not the witness.”).  
 76. Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 677; see 
also Duggin, supra note 18, at 893–99 (discussing the case of Upjohn v. United States, 449 
U.S. 383 (1981)).  
 77. It should be noted that some counsel in the United States also provide an additional 
warning regarding the possibility of the government indicting an individual for obstruction 
of justice should he or she provide false information to internal investigators who then pro-
vide that information to the government. See Lucian E. Dervan, Over-Criminalization 2.0: 
The Role of Plea Bargaining, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 646–49 (2011) (discussing the 
Computer Associates prosecution); see also Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra 
note 1, at 3; (“Although some attorneys provide additional interview warnings to employees, 
counsel must be mindful of the delicate balance between providing sufficient cautions and 
obtaining information necessary to further the company’s investigation.  Excessive warnings 
can chill an employee’s willingness to cooperate.”). 
 78. See Clark, supra note 57, at *4; D. Michael Crites, Recent Trends in White Collar 
Crime, in INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT, 2010 WL 5312199, at *2 (2010); Dowling, 
supra note 43, at 3; .  
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counsel conducting an international internal investigation to interview wit-
nesses if there are parallel proceedings.79 
[M]any European countries have what are called blocking statutes, which 
prohibit the interview of witnesses.  In a potential civil or criminal inves-
tigation in that jurisdiction, of which France is a good example, you are 
not allowed to interview a witness who was also a witness in a French 
criminal investigation.  So if you have a multi-jurisdictional insider trad-
ing investigation, you are not allowed to go to France and interview that 
witness without the permission of the French authorities.80 
Even where such onerous blocking statutes are not applicable, local la-
bor laws and related regulations may impede one’s ability to quickly con-
duct employee interviews in an informal one-on-one setting.81  For exam-
ple, the employee may have the right to consult with representatives before 
being interviewed or to have such representatives present during the inter-
view itself.82 
The second defining encounter with employees during an internal inves-
tigation occurs when employees are disciplined either because they have 
failed to cooperate with the inquiry or the investigation has revealed that 
they have committed wrongful conduct.83  When disciplining employees in 
the United States under either of these scenarios, corporations and their 
counsel have significant discretion in determining the appropriate proce-
dures and punishments, up to and including termination.84  This, however, 
is not the case in most other jurisdictions around the world.85  First, em-
ployees in many countries are not required to cooperate with internal inves-
 
 79. See Clark, supra note 57, at *4; see also Dowling, supra note 43, at 3 (“Some juris-
dictions actually prohibit non-government employers from conducting quasi-criminal inter-
nal investigations on the theory that private parties cannot intrude on the exclusive policing 
authority of government law enforcers.”).  
 80. Clark, supra note 57, at *4; see also Crites, supra note 78, at *2 (“[M]any countries 
have blocking statutes that prohibit counsel from interviewing witnesses without permission 
from the host country.”).  
 81. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 5. 
 82. Id. at 5 (“Local labor laws may require consulting with employee representatives 
before interviewing a slate of employee witnesses, and some jurisdictions require allowing a 
representative to accompany an employee witness in an interview, analogous to American 
Weingarten rights.”).  
 83. See Dervan, Responding to Potential Employee Misconduct, supra note 1, at 678. 
 84. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr. & Darin R. Leong, Britain’s New Discipline Procedure 
Law: Action Steps for American Compliance, 14 INT’L HUM. RESOURCES J. 1, 1 (2005) 
(“Nothing about [Donald] Trump’s brusque procedures [for firing individuals on The Ap-
prentice] strikes American ‘couch potatoes’ as odd, because nothing about it is illegal or 
contrary to U.S. practice.  American-style employment-at-will lets Trump fire anyone for 
any reason (except an illegal reason), and our employment-at-will rule also leaves Trump 
free to use whatever discharge procedure he wants.”).   
 85. See Dowling & Leong, supra note 84, at 1 (“The rest of the world . . . is a lot differ-
ent.  ‘Employment-at-will’ exists almost nowhere else.”).   
120 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
tigations and, therefore, may not be disciplined for such refusals.86  Second, 
employees in foreign jurisdictions are often entitled to damages or sever-
ance pay when terminated, even for good cause, and must be afforded cer-
tain procedural rights during the disciplinary process.87  In this context, 
some countries even impose strict temporal limitations on disciplinary ac-
tions, which can create significant difficulties for internal investigators ex-
amining complex matters.88 
In Belgium, for example, an employee termination for good cause “must 
occur within three working days from the moment the facts are known to 
the [employer]; the facts must be notified to the dismissed [employee] by 
registered mail within three working days from the date of dismissal.”  
The clock here can start as soon as an employer gets a credible allegation, 
not after it completes a full-blown internal investigation.89 
While such restrictions on disciplinary procedures and determinations 
seem unnaturally intrusive in the American corporate context, counsel must 
be aware of the impact of these laws on the course of an international inter-
nal investigation. 
The breadth of laws in foreign jurisdictions regarding disciplinary pro-
cedures is exemplified by a series of communications recently released as 
part of the current investigations of phone-hacking by the now defunct 
News of the World.90  While much attention is currently centered on hack-
ing from recent years, this is not the first time the newspaper had dealt with 
this issue.91  In 2007, Clive Goodman, a former News of the World reporter 
in Britain pleaded guilty to phone-hacking charges and was imprisoned.92  
Shortly after his guilty plea, he received a letter from company officials: 
I am sorry to have to be writing this letter, but am afraid that events of the 
last few days and months provide us no choice but to terminate your em-
ployment with News Group Newspapers Limited. This action, I know you 
 
 86. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 5. (“[O]utside of U.S. employment-at-will, forcing 
employees to ‘cooperate’ raises employment law challenges.  Overseas employees may in 
effect invoke a legal right to remain silent analogous to the right against self-incrimination 
in a U.S. criminal investigation.”); see also Greg Farrell, IMF Dropped Internal Probe of 
Strauss-Kahn After Woman Wouldn’t Cooperate, BLOOMBERG.COM (May 21, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-20/strauss-kahn-imf-probe-aborted-in-2008-as-
alleged-victim-wouldn-t-testify.html (discussing the refusal of an IMF employee to cooper-
ate in a 2008 internal investigation regarding Dominique Strauss-Kahn). 
 87. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 5.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 3 (quoting Carl Bevernage, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT LAWS 3-38 (William L. Keller et al. eds., 2009)). 
 90. See Paul Sonne, Jeanne Whalen & Bruce Orwall, New Issues Emerge for News 
Corp. in Britain, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903480904576511963847040354.html.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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understand, is the consequence of your plea of guilty, and subsequent im-
prisonment on 26 January, in relation to conspiracy to intercept voicemail 
messages.  This obviously constitutes a very serious breach of your obli-
gations as an employee, such as to warrant dismissal without any warning.  
In the circumstances of your plea and the court’s sentence, it is reasonable 
for us to dismiss you without any further enquiries.93 
In response, Goodman sent a letter to the company containing numerous 
allegations, including the following statement: “The dismissal is automati-
cally unfair as the company failed to go through the minimum required 
statutory dismissal procedures.”94 
The newspaper responded to Goodman’s allegations as follows: 
I would like to request your attendance at an appeal hearing on Tuesday, 
20
th
 March 2007 at 10:00 am at the offices of News Magazine Limited . . . 
.  The purpose of the hearing is to consider, under the News International 
disciplinary procedure, your appeal against your dismissal on 5
th
 Febru-
ary, on the grounds raised in your letter of 2
nd
 March. . . .  You are enti-
tled to be accompanied as specified in the Company’s Disciplinary proce-
dures.  Please let me know in advance if you decide to bring a companion 
and their name and contact details.  If there are any documents you wish 
to be considered at the appeal hearing, please provide copies as soon as 
possible.  If you do not have those documents, please provide details so 
that they can be obtained.95 
While such an exchange and appeals process might appear absurd in the 
United States, particularly given the serious criminal conviction of the em-
ployee and the criminal offense’s direct relation to his work at the corpora-
tion, British law imposes strikingly different obligations on employers. 
Since 2004, the United Kingdom has imposed an extensive “Code of 
Practice for Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures” on employers that dic-
tates the manner in which all manner of significant discipline may be im-
posed, including terminations.96  At its most basic, the law requires a three-
step process of notice and meeting prior to any disciplinary action, a disci-
plinary hearing at which the employee may respond to the allegations, and 
an appeals process to challenge the corporation’s disciplinary decision.97  
 
 93. Id. (follow “Documents Relating to Clive Goodman” hyperlink; then view page 
8/36). 
 94. Id. (follow “Goodman’s March 2007 Letter Protesting His Dismissal” hyperlink; 
then view page 2/2). 
 95. Id. (follow “Documents Relating to Clive Goodman” hyperlink; then view page 
12/36). 
 96. See Dowling & Leong, supra note 84, at 1 (“The upshot of these [UK disciplinary 
and grievance laws] is that as of October 1, 2004, in Britain a Donald-Trump-style ‘You’re 
sacked!’ is flatly illegal.”).  
 97. Id. at 3.  In France, the following must be done to satisfy employment laws:  “Set 
meeting with employee or ‘works council,’ via certified mail letter; conduct dismissal meet-
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Failure to abide by these requirements can result in serious penalties for the 
corporation.98 
As with the other unique aspects and challenges of conducting interna-
tional internal investigations, counsel must be aware of the significant dif-
ferences that exist between jurisdictions regarding disciplinary procedures 
and options.  Even in situations where the conduct of the employee under 
review clearly violates corporate standards and rules of conduct, local labor 
laws may dictate the manner in which disciplinary action may be taken.99  
Proceeding without an understanding of the constraints and deadlines im-
posed by such requirements may lead to additional exposure for clients and 
limiting of options in response to troubling conduct by employees.100 
IV.  DISCLOSURE AND SETTLEMENT AFTER INTERNATIONAL INTERNAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
One of the most challenging decisions faced by corporations at the con-
clusion of an internal investigation where the government is, as of yet, un-
aware of the conduct under examination is determining whether to disclose 
the investigatory findings.101  While some disclosures are required by law, 
there can also be several advantages to disclosure even where it is permis-
sive, including receipt of cooperation credit from the DOJ when determin-
ing the appropriate governmental response and potential application of am-
nesty programs.102  As an example, in 2008 the U.S. government alleged 
 
ing; inform about reasons for termination and relocation opportunities; serve formal dismis-
sal notice by certified mail; inform government labor agency.” Id. at 2. See generally Thom-
as Eger, Opportunistic Termination of Employment Contracts and Legal Protection Against 
Dismissal in Germany and the USA, 23 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 381 (2004) (discussing labor 
law requirements in Germany); Otto Kaufman, Weakening of Dismissal Protection or 
Strengthening of Employment Policy in France?, 36 INDUS. L.J. 267 (2007) (discussing la-
bor law requirements in France).  
 98. Dowling & Leong, supra note 84, at 2 (“The imposition of these new procedures is 
no mere technicality, as penalties are severe.”).  
 99. See Dowling, supra note 43, at 6 (“In France, UK, and elsewhere, even for-cause 
terminations of the obviously-guilty must follow detailed procedures.”).   
 100. It is even possible that a corporation might find itself in the unenviable position of 
selecting between abiding by local labor laws or acquiescing to a governmental request that 
culpable employees be punished. See id.  
 101. See Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1, at 9 (“Although counsel 
conducting an internal investigation should take steps to safeguard the company’s attorney-
client privilege, she always should keep in mind that, at some point, it may be necessary or 
even advantageous for the company to disclose the results of the investigation and, perhaps, 
even materials generated during the inquiry.”); see also Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 80 
(“Where a company conducts an internal investigation based upon information it receives 
about possible wrongdoing that is not known to the government, the question arises whether 
the findings of the investigation should be disclosed to the government.”).   
 102. See Murphy & Dervan, Watching Your Step, supra note 1, at 9–10 (“When dealing 
with the government, the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing will 
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that Siemens had engaged in widespread bribery overseas.103  In response, 
the company hired an outside law firm to conduct a thorough internal in-
vestigation.104  The inquiry covered thirty-four countries, included over 
1750 interviews, and resulted in the collection of more than one-hundred 
million documents.105  Throughout this extensive investigation, Siemens 
cooperated fully with the government and provided documents and other 
information as requested.106  As a result, Siemens was rewarded with sig-
nificantly less punishment than might otherwise have been exacted on the 
corporation for its conduct: 
Though Siemens could have been fined as much as $2.7 billion in the 
criminal prosecution, the Justice Department and SEC settled for a com-
bined U.S. total of $800 million. The Justice Department has not prose-
cuted any of the company’s executives or employees for the violations. 
Based partly on Siemens’ cooperation in the case, the U.S. government 
decided that the firm could remain eligible for federal contracts, a priority 
for Siemens.107 
For Siemens, disclosure and cooperation proved to be valuable tools in 
resolving its case in a satisfactory manner with both American and Europe-
an authorities.108 
 
often work to its advantage.  In determining whether to charge a corporation, the Depart-
ment of Justice advises prosecutors to weigh the ‘timely and voluntary disclosure of wrong-
doing and its willingness to cooperate with the government’s investigation.’” (quoting U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 
20, 2003))).  “Even if disclosure to the government does not forestall criminal charges, it 
can significantly reduce the corporation’s exposure to criminal penalties.  The Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines also contain language equating cooperation with a disclosure of ‘perti-
nent information,’ including, if necessary, privileged material.” Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2004)); see also Bennett et al., supra note 23, at 80 
(“[V]arious federal agencies and other regulatory bodies have developed more or less formal 
programs for crediting voluntary disclosures in the exercise of their regulatory authority.”).  
Although the Federal Principles of Prosecution and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have been 
amended over time, these basic edicts remain a centerpiece of the documents.  
 103. See Hilzenrath, supra note 13, at 2 (“The allegations were based largely on an inter-
nal investigation that Siemens, an engineering company based in Germany, began in 2006 
after German authorities raided company offices and employees’ homes.”).  
 104. See id. 
 105. See id.  
 106. See id. at 3 (“Siemens routinely provided English translations of its documents, the 
Justice Department said in a court filing, ‘thereby saving the Department very significant 
time and expense.’”).  
 107. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiar-
ies Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million 
in Combined Fines (Dec. 15, 2008) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.  
 108. See Hilzenrath, supra note 13, at 2–3; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Cor-
porate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the Siemens case); Eric 
Lichtblau & Carter Dougherty, Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion in Fines, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/worldbusiness/16siemens.html (“Sie-
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As was true in the Siemens case, many internal corporate investigations 
today involve examination of international conduct.  Therefore, potential 
resolution of the matter requires consideration of not only American disclo-
sure obligations and advantages, but such obligations and advantages on a 
global scale.109  In this regard, it is important to note first that the United 
States is not the only country that rewards disclosure and cooperation.110  A 
significant example is the EU’s amnesty program in anti-trust cases.111  
Under the European program, the first corporation to reveal its involvement 
in anti-competitive practices receives immunity.112 
[The Commission] will grant immunity from any fine which would oth-
erwise have been imposed to an undertaking disclosing its participation in 
an alleged cartel affecting the Community if that undertaking is the first to 
submit information and evidence which in the Commission’s view will 
enable it to: 
(a) carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the alleged cartel; or 
(b) find an infringement of Article 81 EC in connection with the alleged 
cartel.113 
 
mens, the German engineering giant, agreed Monday to pay a record total of $1.6 billion to 
American and European authorities to settle charges that it routinely used bribes and slush 
funds to secure huge public works contracts around the world.”).  
 109. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 107 (“The Department and the SEC closely col-
laborated with the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office in bringing these cases. The high level 
of cooperation, including sharing information and evidence, was made possible by the use 
of mutual legal assistance provisions of the 1997 Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, which entered into force on Feb. 15, 1999.”). 
While disclosure obligations will not be examined in this Article, it should be noted that 
many jurisdictions have broad requirements that will impact the disclosure decision. See 
Dowling, supra note 43, at 6 (“[L]ocal law in some jurisdictions requires denunciation:  In 
Slovakia, for example, parties with knowledge of a criminal act must notify authorities.”).  
 110. See Roberto Grasso, Note, The E.U. Leniency Programs and U.S. Civil Discovery 
Rules: A Fraternal Fight, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 573 (2008). 
 111. See id.  The United States also has such a program. See Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. 
Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 174–75 (2010) (“The DOJ has established 
and promoted leniency policies to incentivize corporations and individuals to report antitrust 
violations to and cooperate with law enforcement.  The Antitrust Division first implemented 
a leniency program in 1978.  In 1993, the Division significantly revised and greatly im-
proved the leniency program with the issuance of the Corporate Leniency Program.  Under 
the Division’s Corporate Leniency Program, ‘a corporation can avoid criminal conviction 
and fines . . . by being the first to confess participation in a criminal antitrust violation, fully 
cooperating with the Antitrust Division and meeting other specified conditions.’”). 
In fact, the success of the U.S. amnesty program led to the establishment of similar pro-
grams by over fifty other nations. See id. at 183. 
 112. See Grasso, supra note 110, at 573.  
 113. Id. 
2011] INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 125 
Importantly, under the EU anti-trust amnesty program, corporations that 
are not the first through the door can still achieve significant advantages 
from self-reporting the discovered conduct.114 
Companies which do not qualify for immunity may benefit from a reduc-
tion of fines if they provide evidence that represents “significant added 
value” to that already in the Commission’s possession and have terminat-
ed their participation in the cartel.  Evidence is considered to be of a “sig-
nificant added value” for the Commission when it reinforces its ability to 
prove the infringement.  The first company to meet these conditions is 
granted 30 to 50% reduction, the second 20 to 30% and subsequent com-
panies up to 20%.115 
Without carefully examining the unique aspects of disclosure obligations 
and advantages in the various jurisdictions affected, counsel may inadvert-
ently create additional liability for a corporation or forfeit a potentially sig-
nificant advantage. 
It is also important to note that while numerous countries offer ad-
vantages to those who disclose investigatory findings and cooperate with 
governmental inquiries, the globalization of white collar crime and the in-
ternational nature of modern internal investigations also present significant 
challenges to successful resolution and settlement of such matters.  Two 
particular reasons for this challenge will be noted herein.  First, different 
jurisdictions and varying enforcement agencies may be unwilling to operate 
in a uniform timeframe or approach the issue of resolution in a similar 
manner.116  As such, while the DOJ may be pressuring a corporation to set-
tle a matter quickly, a parallel proceeding in the EU might only just be 
starting.  Where such multijurisdictional inquires are operating at different 
speeds or one or more entities are unwilling to enter into negotiations, it 
becomes difficult to settle any of the matters for fear that admissions made 
during one agreement will simply become incriminating admissions for an-
other.117  Second, even where all of the governmental entities involved may 
be willing and prepared to enter into negotiations, significant differences 
regarding what modes of settlement are appropriate may exist.  For exam-
ple, while non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements are ex-
 
 114. See Cartels: Leniency, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html (last updated Nov. 23, 2011).  
 115. Id. 
 116. See Luke Balleny, Anti-Corruption Views—IBA Conference: The Problems with 
Multijurisdictional Corruption Investigations, TRUSTLAW (June 24, 2011, 10:58 PM), 
http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/blogs/anti-corruption-views/iba-conference-the-problems-
with-multijurisdictional-corruption-investigations.  
 117. See id. (“If one set of prosecuting authorities is willing to negotiate and the other 
isn’t, it makes it next to impossible for the defendant to admit to anything of substance to 
the prosecutor that’s open to a settlement.  For if the defendant does admit to something, 
they would simply be giving ammunition for the other prosecutor’s case.”). 
126 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
tremely popular mechanisms by which to settle matters involving potential 
corporate criminal liability, they are rejected forms of resolution in many 
jurisdictions outside the United States.118 
For any corporation embroiled in a significant global white collar crimi-
nal matter, a keen awareness of the challenges regarding disclosure and set-
tlement alternatives on an international scale is invaluable.  In 2010, BAE 
Systems settled a long-standing criminal bribery investigation that had 
spanned several continents.119  The settlement included guilty pleas by the 
corporation in both the United States and the United Kingdom.120  Though 
the case involved complex international issues, BAE was successful in re-
solving the matter in a universally agreeable manner by utilizing the institu-
tions and mechanisms available in each of the affected jurisdictions.121  
According to the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office (UK SFO), the 
agreement between the DOJ, the UK SFO, and BAE was a “ground break-
ing global agreement.”122  As the globalization of white collar crime con-
tinues to bring internal investigations into various international jurisdic-
tions, the necessity of striving for such truly global settlement will only 
continue to become of greater importance. 
 
 118. See Nicolas Bourtin, Conflicts of Laws in International White Collar Investigations, 
in INT’L WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT, supra note 57, available at 2010 WL 271743, at *6 
(2010) (“Outside the United States, the use of such agreements is virtually unheard of.  In-
stead, the expectation is that criminal investigations will end in one of two ways: with a dec-
lination to prosecute or with the filing of charges.”). 
In its simplest form, an NPA [non-prosecution agreement] is an agreement by 
which the government declines to prosecute a defendant in exchange for the de-
fendant’s promise for an agreed period of time to cooperate with the government’s 
investigation, abide by the law, and satisfy any number of other conditions, which 
could include the acknowledgement of wrongful conduct, the payment of a mone-
tary penalty, or the implementation of remedial measures.  Should the defendant 
fail to uphold its end of the agreement, the government is released from its decli-
nation and can file criminal charges.  A DPA [deferred prosecution agreement] in-
corporates many of the provisions of an NPA . . . .  In contrast to an NPA, howev-
er, a DPA contemplates the filing of formal criminal charges, which are stayed for 
an agreed period of time in exchange for the defendant’s obligations under the 
agreement.   
Id.  
 119. See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Corruption Charges, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/business/global/06bribe.html.  
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Press Release, U. K. Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems plc (Feb. 5, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2010/bae-
systems-plc.aspx (“I am very pleased with the global outcome achieved collaboratively with 
the DOJ.  This is a first and it brings a pragmatic end to a long-running and wide-ranging 
investigation.”).  
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CONCLUSION 
Though this Article only begins to touch on the various types of chal-
lenges one might experience as a result of the globalization of internal in-
vestigations, it does reveal one constant in such matters.  Counsel must 
avoid the temptation of utilizing a standard American-style investigatory 
technique when undertaking multi-jurisdictional investigations.  As the 
above examples demonstrate, different jurisdictions and regions of the 
world view the tools and techniques of such inquiries in strikingly different 
ways.  Through realization of the types of challenges that exist in this field 
and a willingness to conduct particularized investigations that are flexible 
to the demands of differing jurisdictions, the achievement of successful and 
thorough internal investigations can continue even in the testing context of 
growing globalization. 
